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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Evidence--Establisbing Identity and Agency of Antiphonal
Speaker.
The witness dialed the telephone number of an insurance office.
A man answered. Upon the witness stating that he wanted to sub-
stitute one car for another in an insurance policy he was asked to
wait a minute. A conversation ensued with a woman unknown to
the witness. Held: Conversation admissible in evidence.'
The mere fact that a conversation is conducted, through a tele-
phonic system does not render it inadmissible in either civil2 or
criminal3 cases. The problem, in the main, is to identify the person
with whom the conversation was held and thus establish a foundation
for relevancy. Evidence authenticating the antiphonal speaker by
recognition of his or her voice is generally held to be sufficient proof
of identity,4 despite the possibility of error created by the mechanical
transmission. And it is sufficient identity if such recognition dawns
upon the witness at any time before the evidence is offered. Such
witness is not required to swear to definite and certain recognition.
Where he states that he is satisfied in his own mind as to the identity
of the voice, but could not swear to it, the evidence is competent.
Completeness of identification goes to the weight of the evidence
and not to the admissibility. 6
Evidence other than voice recognition may establish sufficient
identity, 7 though it subjects the court to multifarious situations with
uncertain limits. Of course, where the witness answers a telephone
call and there is no evidence to authenticate the antiphonal speaker,
except that he states his name, the evidence-is inadmissible as hearsay.8
IZurich General Accident and Liability Ins. Co. v. Baum, 165 S. E. 518
(Va., 1932).
'Gates v. Mader, 316 Ill. 313, 147 N. E. 241 (1925).
" State v. Nixon, 111 Kan. 601, 207 Pac. 854 (1922).
' Merritt v. United States, 264 Fed. 870 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920) (reversed on
confession of error, in 255 U. S. 579, 41 Sup. Ct. 375, 65 L. ed. 795 (1921))
Griffin Mfg. Co. v. Bray, 193 N. C. 350. 137 S. E. 151 (1927).
'People v. Strolla, 191 N. Y. 42, 83 N. E. 573 (1908) ; People v. McDonald,
177 App. Div. 806, 165 N. Y. Supp. 41, 44 (1917): "When a witness gives his
opinion of the identity of a voice heard over the telephone...., it matters not
whether the knowledge which enables him to form such opinion was obtained
before or after the voice over the wire was heard." People v. Dunbar Con-
tracting Co., 215 N. Y. 416, 109 N. E. 554.
'State v. Nixon, supra note 3.
TRobilio v. United States, 291 Fed. 975 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923) (certiorari
denied in 263 U. S. 716, 44 Sup. Ct. 137, 68 L. ed. 522 (1923)).
1 State ex rel. Strohfeld v. Cox, 325 Mo. 901, 30 S. W. (2d) 462 (1930);
Griffin Mfg. Co. v. Bray, supra note 4; People v. Thompson, 231 Mich. 256,
203 N. W. 863 (1925).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
But it has been held that where the caller states his name and in ad-
dition agrees to meet the witness at a certain place, and does so, the
transaction as a whole establishes sufficient identity.9 And many
courts have held that if the caller expresses an acquaintance with
some transaction known to the witness a prima facie case of identity
may be established.' 0 Where a letter has been mailed to or received
from the caller who expresses familiarity with the substance of the
letter, identification is sufficient." Evidence obtained from the
record at the central telephone office, tending to show that the call
came from the telephone of the one purported to have called, renders
the conversation admissible, even though the evidence is not con-
clusive. 1 2  Where the witness, unable to speak to the person for
whom he calls, leaves a message for the party to call him and later
someone purporting to be that party calls the witness the facts and
circumstances render the conversation admissible.' 3
The courts make a meritorious distinction between those cases
in which the witness is called and the party calling is not recognized
but represents himself to be a certain individual and a case wherein
the witness calls a telephone number and receives a reply purporting
to be from the party called. 14 In the latter case there is not the
chande of premeditated fraud as where the witness is called. And
such facts and circumstances are sufficient to make a pria facie case
of identity.'5 These prima facie cases include not only the calling of
a private number but also the calling for some particular person in
a business office. 16
The courts are liberal as to the identification necessary where a
party calls a place of business maintaining a telephone and is an-
swered by a stranger purporting to have authority to deal with the
caller. The conversation is admissible under two presumptions
'State v. Daffy, 179 Minn. 439, 229 N. W. 558 (1930).
'E. g. Chubb v. Sodler, 284 Fed. 910 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922).
"See Van Piper v. United States, 13 F. (2d) 961, 968 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926)
Am. & British Mfg. Corp. v. New Idria Mining Co., 293 Fed. 509 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1923).
" International Harvester Co. v. Caldwell, 198 N. C. 751, 153 S. E. 325
(1930).
"See Meyer Milling Co. v. Strohfied, 224 Mo. 508, 20 S. W. (2d) 963
(1929).
"Epperson v. Rostatter, 90 Ind. 8, 168 N. E. 126 (1929). Cf. State v.
Burleson, 198 N. C. 61, 150 S. E. 628 (1929) (where the person answering
said she was not the pergon called but would call the desired party and later
another person answered purporting to be the desired party, held, sufficient
evidence of identity) ; In re Estate of Wood v. Tyler, 256 Ill. App. 401 (1930)
"Rice v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 250 Mich. 398, 230 N. W. 181 (1930)
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The first one, based on the accuracy of the telephonic system, is that
the person is in the business office called; the other is that such persont
was authorized to transact the particular business over the telephone..
This latter presumption is based on the fact that when the business
unit maintains a telephone in its office it impliedly invites the public
to deal with it by such means and that during office hours some person'
with authority to transact the particular business will answer the
telephone.17 The 'burden is thus on the party called to show that
the person replying had no authority.18 These presumptions are un-
necessary when pursuant to the conversation action is taken which
only an authorized agent could take.19 In some particular businesses
the presumption may be that the person answering the telephone is
not authorized to deal with the subject in litigation.20 Some judicial
authorities do not recognize this presumptive agency rule at all.21
Thus to prove agency without the aid of this presumption will neces-
sitate identifying (in person) the telephonic speaker.
' Potomac Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 206 Ky. 434, 267 S. W. 188, 189 (1924)
"The law is not only a practical, but a progressive, science, and takes cognizance
of the modern methods of communication and the means used therefor. When
an individual or corporation engaged in a particular line of business installs
in its office a telephone, whereby it may be connected through the telephone
system with a large number of people, presumably it invites them to do business
with it through that means of communication, and presumably it thereby
advertises to the business world that it at all times has in its office some person
to communicate with others as to its particular line of business, and deal
with them through that method of communication. It would in many instances
hamper the transaction of its business, and cast suspicion upon the validity of
the agreements made from its office over the telephone if it was incumbent
upon the other party to establish the identity of the person to whom he talked,
and his authority to represent the corporation or individual. On the contrary,
the fair presumption is that such individual or corporation has always at its
office somebody authorized to speak for it in the transaction of its particular
line of business. . . . Out of this modern method of doing business has
grown a modification, to the extent indicated, of the general rule that one dealing
with one professing to be the agent of another does so at his peril, and must
not only establish the agency before holding the principal liable, but must
establish the extent of such agency. ...
'Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Campbell, 212 S. W. 720 (Tex. Civ. App.
1919) (the presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof to the
contrary).
"Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. 'Lawhead, 62 F. (2d) 927 (C. C. A. 4th,
1933) (where the call to an insurance agency requested a change in a policy
and the one calling received by mail a policy containing the change promised
in the conversation).
'Robinson v. Lancaster Foundry Co., 152 Md. 81, 136 Atl. 58, 50 A. L. R.
1196 (1927) (where the general rule was recognized but limited under the
facts of the case as there was nothing on which to base the presumption but
rather presumption of no authority to pay maturing negotiable paper).
' Lacoma & E. Lumber Co. v. A. B. Field & Co., 100 Wash. 79, 170 Pac.
360 (1918).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
A complex problem arises where a person in a telephone conver-
sation recognizes the voice of the antiphonal speaker and turns the
telephone over to the witness who does not identify the speaker. It
has been held that the witness may testify to the subsequent con-
versation, as it is hardly probable that another succeeded the speaker
-at the other end of the line.2 2 Identification was sufficiently estab-
lished in a case in which the defendant, conversing with a third
party, asked to speak to the witness and later admitted to the third
party that he had done so.
23
A different case arises where a bystander attempts to give testi-
inony tending to show the identity of the speaker at the other end
of the line. In the absence of personal knowledge as to the identity
such evidence may be hearsay.2 4 But "a telephone conversation be-
tween the parties, and upon this subject matter in litigation, having
been testified to -by one of the parties, may also be testified to by a
bystander, so far as he heard it."
'
25
The decision in the instant case seems to be in line with the
general trend of judicial opinion. A presumption of agency is sub-
stantiated by the fact that the party first answering the telephone
called another to take the particular message. For the court not
to consider the practical use of the telephone in the commercial
world and to require further identity of the antiphonal speaker than
a presumptive showing of his agency would be to restrict business
to the rules established before the coming of the telephone.
W. E. ANGLIN.
Evidence-Jury's Deliberations as Privileged.
The defendant, a juror indicted for contempt, was charged with
concealing or misstating facts bearing upon ineligibility during her
voir dire examination. Testimony of other jurors as to what de-
fendant said during the deliberations in the jury room was admitted
as evidence that her answers were false and evasive and that she
was biased and prejudiced at the time of the examination. Held:
' Marton v. United States, 60 Fed. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 7th, 1832).
People v. Albritton, 110 Cal. 188, 294 Pac. 76 (1930).
2Pitt Lumber Co. v. Askew, 185 N. C. 87, 116 S. E. 93 (1923) (where a
bystander was allowed to testify as to what he actually heard but could not
give substantive testimony as to the identity of the one at the other end of
the line).
'Kent v. Cobb, 133 Pac. 424 (Colo. 1913). Cf. Sanders v. Griffin, 191
N. C. 447, 132 S. E. 157 (1926), (where the bystander gave testimony as to
what he heard as original evidence).
